​Stepping stone: On nuclear policy, the SHANTI Bill

Nuclear power contributed only around 3% of the electricity generated in India in 2024-25. The government has set a target to install 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047, including from at least five indigenous small modular reactors by 2033. In this picture, the SHANTI Bill proposes to change who can legally build and operate civil nuclear facilities. By allowing the Centre to permit nuclear energy activities through licences to government entities, joint ventures and “any other company” (subject to conditions), SHANTI indicates that the intended new class of operators is domestic private capital rather than foreign plant owners. India being able to meet its 100 GW target will indeed require large capital mobilisation, and allowing licensed non-government entities expands the roster of entities that can share the construction risk. SHANTI also seeks to keep the most sensitive fuel cycles in state control while holding room for private participation in plant delivery and parts of the supply chain, reducing scope of commercial entry to those segments most relevant to scale power generation and keeping functions sensitive to nuclear proliferation with the state. The Bill could also mitigate the legal ambiguity new entrants face by putting safety, enforcement and dispute resolution and the terms of participation in the same statute. This could also reduce transaction costs for developers and shrink site approval and commissioning timelines.

However, the Bill’s liability and governance provisions warrant caution. The maximum operator liability for a nuclear incident is ₹3,000 crore. The Centre is liable for nuclear damage beyond the operator’s cap and can also assume full liability for a non-government installation if in the public interest. These choices make investment risk easier to price but also ask whether the capped operator amount is adequate for victims and for environmental remediation. Second, SHANTI requires operators to maintain insurance or other financial security, but exempts the Centre’s nuclear installations, rendering clear public accounting very important. It also allows operator recourse only when expressly provided in a written contract or when an incident is due to an act or an omission with the intent to cause nuclear damage. This makes supplier accountability depend largely on what the operator secures by contract, which means how much recourse the operator has against suppliers can vary across projects. Finally, India’s nuclear governance needs to address its regulator’s independence. While SHANTI creates a statutory framework, it also vests significant influence in appointments with the Centre and the Atomic Energy Commission. This is still not conducive to increasing public trust and may also deter investor confidence.

Overall Analysis

The editorial evaluates the SHANTI Bill as a cautious but consequential shift in India’s nuclear policy, framing it as an incremental reform rather than a radical overhaul. It opens with data on nuclear power’s modest share in India’s energy mix and the government’s ambitious 2047 targets, using numbers to establish urgency and scale. The language is measured and policy-focused, presenting SHANTI as a pragmatic response to the capital and capacity constraints that have historically limited nuclear expansion.

The author then explains the Bill’s central idea: widening the pool of eligible operators to include domestic private entities while keeping sensitive nuclear fuel cycles under state control. The tone here is cautiously optimistic. Phrases such as “expand the roster of entities” and “share the construction risk” suggest a deliberate attempt to balance growth with security. The editorial highlights legal clarity, reduced transaction costs, and faster approvals as key advantages, portraying SHANTI as a facilitative framework for scale without compromising non-proliferation concerns.

In the second half, the tone shifts to scrutiny and restraint. The editorial raises substantive concerns about liability caps, governance, and regulatory independence. The capped operator liability is questioned for its adequacy in compensating victims and addressing environmental damage, indicating an ethical and public-interest lens. The discussion on supplier accountability and insurance exemptions underscores potential asymmetries in risk-sharing, while the critique of regulator appointments points to a deeper institutional weakness. The language here is precise and cautionary, warning that investor confidence and public trust hinge on stronger safeguards.

Overall, the editorial adopts a balanced stance—acknowledging SHANTI as a necessary step toward nuclear expansion, but insisting that unresolved governance and liability issues must be addressed for the policy to be credible and sustainable.

Important Vocabulary (5)

1. Mobilisation – the act of gathering or deploying resources for a purpose.
2. Proliferation – the spread of nuclear materials or weapons.
3. Ambiguity – lack of clarity or certainty.
4. Recourse – the right to seek compensation or legal remedy.
5. Conducive – helpful in bringing about a particular outcome.

Conclusion & Tone

The editorial concludes that the SHANTI Bill is a meaningful first step toward scaling India’s nuclear power sector by enabling private participation, but it falls short on liability clarity and regulatory independence. Addressing these gaps is essential to ensure safety, accountability, and public confidence.

Tone: Analytical, cautiously optimistic, and policy-critical.