“The principle of ‘Collective Responsibility’ under Article 75(3) is the bedrock of Parliamentary democracy, ensuring executive accountability to the Legislature. However, the increasing reliance on Ordinances under Article 123 to bypass legislative scrutiny, and the use of ‘Money Bill’ certification under Article 110 to circumvent the Rajya Sabha, arguably dilute this accountability. In this context, critically examine the tension between executive efficiency and parliamentary supremacy. Evaluate the judicial safeguards available against such ‘constitutional bypasses’ with reference to recent Supreme Court judgments.”

ANSWER

1. Introduction

Article 75(3) mandates that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People, making legislative control over the executive the cornerstone of Indian parliamentary democracy. However, the growing tendency to govern through Ordinances (Art. 123) and classify contentious legislation as Money Bills (Art. 110) creates a structural tension between executive efficiency and parliamentary supremacy, risking an “executive democracy” rather than a parliamentary one.

2. Body

A. Ordinance Making Power: Parallel Legislature

• Repromulgation as Fraud on Constitution: In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017), the SC held that repeated repromulgation of ordinances without legislative approval is a “fraud on the Constitution” and violates the separation of powers.
• Legislative Vacuum Exploitation: Ordinances are increasingly used not for “immediate action” during recess, but to bypass a hostile Upper House or avoid debate, negating the deliberative function of Parliament.

B. Money Bill Certification: Circumventing Bicameralism

• Speaker’s Finality vs. Judicial Review: Article 110(3) makes the Speaker’s certification final, but Roger Matthew v. South Indian Bank (2019) and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) (2018) established that this finality is subject to judicial review if the classification lacks a “rational nexus” with Art. 110 clauses.
• Erosion of Rajya Sabha’s Role: Routing the Finance Act, Aadhaar Act, and Tribunal Reforms via Money Bill route reduces the Upper House to a mere “delaying chamber,” violating the federal balance envisaged in Art. 79.

C. Impact on Collective Responsibility

• Accountability Deficit: When laws are made via Ordinance or passed as Money Bills without Rajya Sabha amendments, the executive evades the “daily assessment” by the legislature (debates, questions, committees), weakening Art. 75(3).
• Ordinance Raj: The D.C. Wadhwa (1987) warning against an “Ordinance Raj” remains unheeded, with governments repromulgating ordinances for years (e.g., Enemy Property Ordinance repromulgated 5 times).

3. Conclusion

The Constitution envisages a delicate equilibrium: the executive proposes, but the legislature disposes. Judicial interventions in Krishna Kumar and Roger Matthew act as necessary “constitutional circuit breakers.” However, judicial review is a remedy of last resort. Strengthening Parliamentary Committees (DRSCs), enforcing a mandatory time-limit for Ordinance replacement (e.g., 6 weeks), and evolving a bipartisan convention on Money Bill definition (per Punchhi Commission) are essential to restore the sanctity of Collective Responsibility and prevent the hollowing out of Parliamentary democracy.