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Troubling repeat: On ISRO’s failed PSLV-C62 mission
On January 12, as the PSLV-C62 mission rose from Sriharikota into the morning sky and its third stage kicked on, the live telecast abruptly stopped showing the rocket’s performance and trajectory. As it became evident that its third stage had suffered an anomaly, putting paid to the C62 mission in a manner similar to the PSLV-C61 mission in May 2025, the change in the telecast became more familiar. For decades, the PSLV has been the ‘workhorse’ of India’s space ambitions. Together with the rocket’s technology being mature, the implication is that the mistakes that sank two PSLV launches could be on the quality assurance side. At least, these are not likely to be isolated anomalies. The C61 mission failed after its third stage lost chamber pressure, but rather than publicly reveal the diagnosed root cause, the decision was to leave the Failure Analysis Committee (FAC) report with the Prime Minister’s Office. ISRO provided assurances of “structural reinforcements” and cleared the PSLV for its next flight. The symptom of the C62 failure, a “roll rate disturbance”, parallels the events preceding the C61 failure. The financial consequences are poor: under the aegis of NewSpace India Limited, ISRO has been positioning the PSLV as a commercial product in a competitive global launch market. Now, international insurers operating in this market will reassess the PSLV’s risk profile and the insurance premiums could skyrocket, rendering the vehicle less affordable — a strategic embarrassment for a country aspiring to be a net provider in space.
The tenure of ISRO Chairman V. Narayanan has been characterised by a continued shift away from ISRO’s traditional culture of scientific openness toward a more guarded, bureaucratic posture. While the pressure to maintain a high launch cadence is understandable, his decision to move the C62 mission to the pad while the autopsy of its predecessor remains classified should raise tough questions about the organisation’s priorities. That the C62 mission also carried the EOS-N1 satellite, built by the DRDO and with unspecified strategic applications, could help explain a ‘rush’ if there was one. Fortunately for Mr. Narayanan, ISRO has also demonstrated the increasing reliability of its LVM-3 rocket in his time, most recently with the M6 mission in December 2025. But right now, ISRO’s and his best path to restoring confidence, and begin the painful work of rebuilding quality assurance protocols, is for the Department of Space to release the FAC report for the C61 mission. The tax-paying public and commercial stakeholders deserve to know what went wrong in 2025, whether it recurred in 2026, and why the third stage was affected again.
Overall Analysis
The editorial adopts a critical and investigative stance to examine ISRO’s repeated failure of its PSLV missions, specifically the PSLV-C62 following the earlier PSLV-C61 setback. It begins with a vivid, almost cinematic description of the live telecast abruptly cutting away — a narrative device that signals both technical failure and institutional opacity. This opening immediately establishes a mood of concern and familiarity, suggesting that such failures and the manner of their communication are becoming disturbingly routine.
The author then contrasts the PSLV’s historical reputation as India’s “workhorse” launch vehicle with the present failures, implicitly arguing that repeated third-stage anomalies in a mature technology point not to design flaws but to lapses in quality assurance. The language here is analytical and cautious, avoiding sensationalism while still drawing firm conclusions. The editorial’s criticism sharpens when it highlights ISRO’s refusal to publicly release the Failure Analysis Committee report, portraying this as a departure from scientific transparency and accountability.
In the latter half, the focus shifts from technical failure to institutional culture and leadership choices. The author critiques ISRO’s growing bureaucratisation under its current chairman, noting how secrecy and schedule pressure may have overridden caution. The mention of the satellite’s strategic DRDO link subtly suggests possible political or security pressures, without making explicit accusations — a careful, measured use of insinuation rather than assertion.
The final section broadens the consequences beyond national pride to economic and strategic costs. By explaining how insurers and global markets may reassess the PSLV’s reliability, the editorial connects technical lapses to real financial and reputational damage. The concluding argument is prescriptive: restoring confidence requires transparency, specifically the release of the FAC report, so that both taxpayers and commercial stakeholders can trust ISRO’s corrective processes.
Overall, the editorial blends technical reasoning, institutional critique, and policy concern, using formal yet forceful language to argue that secrecy, not failure itself, poses the greater risk to ISRO’s credibility.
Important Vocabulary (5)
- Anomaly – something that deviates from what is standard or expected.
- Workhorse – a reliable and consistently performing system or tool.
- Autopsy (figurative) – a detailed examination to determine the cause of failure.
- Aegis – protection, backing, or authority of an organisation.
- Embarrassment (strategic) – an event causing reputational or policy damage rather than personal shame.
Conclusion & Tone
The editorial argues that ISRO’s repeated PSLV failures demand transparency and introspection rather than silence and haste. It stresses that institutional credibility, commercial viability, and public trust can only be rebuilt through openness and rigorous quality assurance.
Tone: Critical, analytical, and cautionary, with an undercurrent of institutional concern.
